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ABSTRACT: While many scholars have rightfully critiqued the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) as falling short of achieving the ultimate goal of
equal employment opportunities for women, this Article reveals one of the
PDA's most important successes. By recognizing pregnant women as a "given"
in the workplace, the PDA launched a quiet revolution in the way that judges
make causal attributions for adverse employment outcomes. Specifically, the
PDA provided judges with the conceptual tools that were needed to help shift
causal attributions to an employer, rather than attributing a pregnant woman's
struggles in the workplace to her own decision to become a mother. Because
our notions of responsibility follow our notions of causation, this shift in causal
attribution enabled judges to more easily identify employers as legally
responsible for the misfit between the conventional workplace and working
women's lives. While this causal attribution shift has been incomplete, it at
least laid the foundation for ongoing conversations about how the law might
achieve even deeper structural and organizational transformations in the
workplace looking forward. By revealing the PDA's causation transformation
story, this Article seeks to shore up that foundation for future efforts at
designing workplaces more fully around a caregiving worker norm.
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INTRODUCTION
The reasonable [wo]man adapts [her]self to the world: the
unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to [her]self.
Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable [wo]man.
- George Bernard Shaw'
With the benefit of perfect hindsight, it is not difficult to identify ways in
which the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) 2 has fallen short of providing
women equal employment opportunities. Although the PDA prohibits
discrimination against pregnant women who can fully perform their employers'
demands, the PDA does not directly dismantle inflexible workplace policies,
procedures, and norms that continue to exclude pregnant women who are
unable to do so, as long as the employer treats pregnant women "the same" as
other employees who are similarly limited in their ability to work.3 Although
the disparate impact theory has the potential to transform some of these
exclusionary practices,4 the PDA's protection ends when the pregnancy and
any "related medical conditions" end. 5 As a result, the PDA does not require
employers to modify the workplace to allow women with caregiving
responsibilities, including breastfeeding needs, to compete on level ground.6
Many scholars, myself included, have devoted much of our academic careers to
revealing these and other ways in which the conventional workplace
discriminates against women who combine caregiving work with labor force
participation.7
1. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN: A COMEDY AND A PHILOSOPHY 238 (1903). A
tip of the hat goes to Matt Miller, guest columnist in The New York Times, who recognized that Shaw's
observation applied to his wife and other women who continue to demand that workplaces be adapted to
caregivers, rather than vice versa. See Matt Miller, Listen to My Wife, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2005, at
A25.
2. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (requiring that pregnant women "be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work").
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (defining the protected category of "sex" to include
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions").
6. See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr. Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
PDA does not protect a woman from discrimination because of her childcare responsibilities); Fejes v.
Gilpin Ventures Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-92 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that the PDA does not
protect a woman from discrimination because she is breastfeeding or because she has childcare
responsibilities); Wallace v. Pyro Mining, 789 F. Supp. 867, 869-70 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (holding that the
PDA does not protect a woman from discrimination because she is breastfeeding), aff'd, 951 F.2d 351
(6th Cir. 1991).
7. See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT To DO ABOUT IT (2003) (revealing the range of structural and organizational workplace norms
that are incompatible with a non-ideal worker with caregiving needs); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and
Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the
Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989) (describing the conflicts between occupational and
family life cycles and the role of gender, race, and class in work/family conflict); Mary Joe Frug,
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Rather than adding to this wealth of important scholarship, this Article will
use the PDA's thirtieth anniversary as an opportunity to highlight one of the
PDA's most important successes. By legislatively recognizing the economic
and social reality that pregnant women are a given in the workplace, the PDA
fueled a quiet revolution in the way that courts (and potentially employers and
the public more generally) make causal attributions for adverse employment
outcomes. Specifically, the PDA provided judges with the conceptual tools to
shift their causal attributions to an employer, rather than attribute a pregnant
woman's struggles in the workplace to her own decision to become a mother.
Because our notions of responsibility follow our notions of causation, this shift
in causal attribution helped begin to reinforce the feminist view that employers
may be legally responsible for the misfit between the conventional workplace
and working women's lives.
In this way the PDA was a victory, albeit an incomplete one, for all of us
who aspire to George Bernard Shaw's conception of unreasonableness, as
viewed through my own gendered lens in the slightly-modified introductory
quote above. For all of us "unreasonable women" in the workforce who persist
in believing that equality requires adapting the workplace to the life patterns of
women rather than the other way around, the PDA represents progress. More
broadly, the PDA's effect on causal attributions in legal analysis represents a
foundational step in all of the ongoing conversations about how the law might
achieve even deeper structural and organizational transformations going
forward. By revealing the PDA's effect on causation, this Article seeks to shore
up that foundation for future efforts at using the law to design workplaces more
fully around a caregiving worker norm.
I. CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND THE PDA
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers
to discriminate "because of' sex. 8 This "because of' language brings causation
to center stage in discrimination claims. The causation issue often is formally
framed around a determination of whether the protected status was or was not a
motivating factor in an employment decision. However, finding causation
Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55
(1979) (identifying the barriers that working mothers face in the waged labor market); Michelle A.
Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283 (2003) [hereinafter
Travis, Virtual Workplace] (explaining how technological innovation, such as the telecommuting
revolution, gets adapted to the workplace status quo rather than providing true flexibility for workers
with caregiving responsibilities); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Travis, Recapturing]
(demonstrating how the "full-time face-time norm" disproportionately excludes workers who are
caregivers); Michelle A. Travis, Telecommuting: The Escher Stairway of Work/Family Conflict, 55 ME.
L. REV. 261 (2003) (explaining how the telecommuting revolution has been adapted to the workplace
status quo rather than providing true flexibility for workers with caregiving responsibilities).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2000).
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frequently rests on a more general determination of whether the employment
outcome was really the result of the employee's own performance, conduct,
choice, or decision, rather than simply the result of her status. In other words,
courts often implicitly decide whether to view the employee or the employer as
the "cause" of the employment event at issue. Our legal attributions of
responsibility-like our social attributions of responsibility-follow our
attributions of causation. 9 The success of antidiscrimination law thus depends
upon the accuracy with which judges make causal attributions. The
psychological study of causal attribution theory is therefore essential in
understanding the development of employment discrimination law.
Causal attribution theory is the branch of social cognition theory that
studies the process by which people arrive at explanations for social events.
10
More specifically, causal attribution is the cognitive process by which people
link a social event to a particular causal antecedent." Social scientists have
discovered that our rapid and often unconscious causal attribution process is
typically efficient, effective, and highly adaptive, but at the same time it is also
predictably biased. 12 These researchers have documented a variety of ways in
which we systematically make attribution errors when assessing the world
around us.
13
In his recent book, The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window Into
Human Nature, Steven Pinker analyzes one such limitation on accurate causal
attributions: the conceptual semantics of causal theory. 14 Pinker's book
explains that notions of causality are "woven into language," and he
demonstrates how our language of causation sets the parameters for "how we
understand our surroundings" and "how we assign credit and blame."' 15 In
particular, Pinker has studied the conceptual semantics that govern our causal
attributions "whenever a collection of circumstances is necessary for an effect
9. See STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE
232 (2007) ("Our concept of causation is indispensable to our attribution of credit and blame in
everyday life.").
10. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 57-95 (2d ed. 1991); MILES
HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: FROM COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO COLLECTIVE BELIEFS 37 (1989);
Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 198-200 (Leonard Berowitz ed., 1977).
11. See HEWSTONE, supra note 10, at 37; Ross, supra note 10, at 175.
12. See Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55
VAND, L. REV. 481, 509-42 (2002) (summarizing the social science research on causal attribution
biases).
13. See id.
14. See PINKER, supra note 9, at vi (identifying a "theory of causality" embedded in "the way we
use words"); see also id. at 209 (explaining that "causality is deeply entrenched in our language and
thought, including our moral sense"). Steven Pinker studies language and cognition as a professor in the
Department of Psychology at Harvard University. See Steven Pinker, http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/
about/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). He previously taught in the Department of Brain and
Cognitive Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See id.
15. PINKER, supra note 9, at vii.
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to occur."1 6 That is the case when a woman loses her job or suffers another
adverse employment action because she is pregnant: The result depends upon
both the woman's pregnancy and the employer's inflexible practices or
prejudiced norms. Pinker has found that rather than identifying all necessary
circumstances as "causes," we generally single out one circumstance and label
it the cause, which we then view as the responsible event. 17 "People somehow
distinguish just one of the necessary conditions for an event as its cause and the
others as mere enablers," explains Pinker, "even when all are equally
necessary." 18
How do we choose which circumstance to identify as the cause and
therefore the responsible event? Pinker explains that we use a technique
involving the generation of counter-factuals. 19 We make "an implicit
comparison with certain other states of affairs (similar possible worlds, if you
will) that we keep in the back of our minds as reasonable alternatives to the
status quo.",20 The circumstance for which we can most easily generate a
plausible counter-factual or imagine an alternative state of affairs, or the
circumstance that we believe someone could have controlled most easily, is the
one that we label the cause.
21
To illustrate this phenomenon, Pinker uses the example of a match burning,
which requires a collection of necessary circumstances to occur: someone
striking the match, the match being dry, oxygen being present, and there being
shelter from the wind. 22 "In all the possible worlds similar to ours in which the
match is wet, the room is filled with carbon dioxide, or the striker is outdoors,
the match does not bum," explains Pinker.23 Nonetheless, when people are
asked what caused the match to burn, they generally say it was caused by
striking the match: "[W]e single out the act of striking it, not the presence of
oxygen, the dryness of the match, or the presence of four walls and a roof.",
24
This is because the circumstance for which we can most easily imagine an
alternative state of affairs, and the circumstance that we believe someone most
easily could have controlled, is the act of striking the match. "Since oxygen is
pretty much always around, we don't think of its presence as a cause of a match
igniting," explains Pinker. 25 "But since we spend more time not striking
16. Id. at 213.
17. Id. at 213-14.
18. Id. at 214.
19. Id. at 213.
20. Id. at 214.
21. Id. ("To label a condition as a 'cause' means to identify a factor that we feel could easily have
been different, or that someone could have controlled, or that someone might control in the future.").
22. Id. at 213.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 214.
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matches than striking them, and feel that it is up to us at any moment whether
we strike or not, we do credit the striking as a cause."
26
There are ways, however, to shift our causal attributions from one
necessary circumstance to another, thereby shifting where we rest
responsibility. This can be accomplished by making counter-factuals of another
circumstance easier to generate or by changing our assumptions about which
circumstance most easily could have been different or controlled.27 In other
words, "[c]hange the comparison set and you change the cause." 2 If the
initiation of fire is considered in the context of welding, for example, our
identification of the cause shifts. Certain types of welding are typically done in
oxygen-free chambers specifically to avoid the risk of fire. 29 If oxygen
somehow enters the chamber, and subsequently a spark ignites and fire ensues,
we generally identify the presence of oxygen as the cause of the fire, rather
than any act by the person involved in the event. 30 In that context, the easiest
circumstance for which to imagine an alternative state of affairs, and the
circumstance we believe could have been controlled most easily, was the lack
of oxygen.
Similarly, if we change our perception of a person's role in an event from
one of active or direct participation to one of passive or indirect participation,
our causal attributions may shift away from that person, even if that person's
conduct was necessary for the event to occur. To illustrate this point, Pinker
describes an experiment in which psychologists told subjects to imagine a coin
perched on its edge. 3 1 Some subjects were told that the coin was about to fall
onto heads but that an actor rolled a marble at the coin and knocked it onto
tails.32 Other subjects were told that the coin was about to fall onto tails, that a
marble had been rolled at the coin and was going to knock it onto heads, but
that an actor stopped the marble before it touched the coin, and that the coin fell
onto tails as it was leaning originally.33 Subjects typically described the actor in
the first scenario, but not the actor in the second scenario, as having caused the
coin to fall onto tails, despite the fact that the actors' conduct was a necessary
or "but for" cause of the coin falling onto tails in both situations. 34 In the
former scenario, the actor was viewed as an active participant exerting a force





30. Id. (including the interesting real-world example of the fire that killed three Apollo astronauts
in 1967, which "is commonly blamed on the pure oxygen that filled the capsule, causing a minor spark
to grow into an inferno").
3 1. See id. at 223.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. In other words, "but for" the actor's conduct in either situation, the result would have
been different.
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the actor was viewed as a passive participant who exerted a force on something
else-on the marble, rather than on the coin. Pinker calls this a lay person's
"force-dynamic" conception of causation, 35 which often ends up ignoring
necessary causal antecedents.
Pinker has found that the use of causal semantics plays a significant role in
establishing these often erroneous causal perceptions. In other words, words
matter. In some situations, our natural choice of words favors verbs that help
convey a conclusion of causation, such as "get," "make," or "set."3 6 In other
situations, our natural choice of words favors the use of verbs that convey mere
enablement, such as "allow," "let," or "permit," which do not result in causal
attributions despite their subjects' causal role. 37
This understanding of the conceptual semantics of causal theory helps
explain how important the PDA has been in advancing women's workplace
equality. As noted above, when a woman suffers an adverse employment action
because she is pregnant, that event results from multiple necessary
circumstances, including both the woman becoming pregnant and the
employer's inflexible practices or prejudiced norms. Pinker's theory of counter-
factual causal logic reveals how easy it was prior to the PDA for employers,
society, and, most importantly, judges to identify the woman's decision to
become a mother as the cause and therefore the act solely responsible for the
adverse action. 38 Prior to the PDA, there was nothing in Title VII's general
prohibition of sex discrimination that explicitly directed, constrained, or
counteracted judges' normal attribution biases. Because the counter-factual of
the worker not being pregnant or not having pregnancy-related performance
limitations was often more salient and readily imaginable than the counter-
factual of the workplace designed around the life patterns of a woman, it was
quite possible for judges who were applying the statute's general "because of"
language to view pregnancy as a choice rather than a status, and therefore not
to recognize the employer as a causal actor in pregnant women's sex
discrimination claims. Analogizing to Pinker's matchstick example, getting
pregnant was like striking the match, and the workplace policies, practices, and
norms that were incompatible with a woman's pregnancy were like the match
being dry, oxygen being present, and there being shelter from the wind.
Because inflexible workplaces designed around the life patterns of men were
typically all that existed, judges did not always readily conceive of the
employer as a cause of pregnant women's struggles to compete.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 219.
37. See id.
38. See generally Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992) (analyzing cases in which courts attributed women's relegation to low-wage
and low-status jobs with few opportunities for advancement to women's "lack of interest" in better
positions, rather than to any discriminatory action taken by the employers).
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The Supreme Court demonstrated these causal attribution biases in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,39 which was the immediate impetus for the PDA's
enactment.4 ° In Gilbert, the Court held that an employer did not engage in
actionable discrimination by excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from its
otherwise comprehensive disability benefits plan for non-occupational illnesses
and injuries. 41 Although the adverse benefits action suffered by the class of
women plaintiffs was necessarily the result of both the plaintiffs' becoming
pregnant and the employer's decision to exclude a uniquely-gendered condition
from its policy, the Court failed to recognize the employer's causal role. The
Court compared pregnant women to other workers who might seek non-
occupational disability benefits and concluded that pregnancy was
"significantly different" because it is often a "voluntarily undertaken and
desired condition., 42 The counter-factual of a worker not choosing to become
pregnant was much easier to generate as an alternative state of affairs than was
an employer choosing to provide an all-inclusive benefits policy or one that
offers equivalent coverage for the work lives of both women and men.
Accordingly, the Court viewed the women's own decision to become pregnant
as the circumstance that could have been controlled most easily, and therefore
the circumstance that was most salient for selection as the cause and the legally
responsible act.
The specific causal semantics used in Gilbert nicely illustrate Pinker's
observation that words matter. The majority implicitly compared the
employer's disability policy to the counter-factual of a workplace without any
disability plan at all. It thus described the only active component of the
employer's conduct as the decision to give disability coverage to both men and
women for a wide range of non-occupational illnesses and injuries that affect
all workers.43 The Court then described the plaintiffs' claim as a challenge to
the plan's underinclusiveness, and it described the employer's allegedly
improper conduct as failing to include the unique condition of pregnancy-
related disabilities." These words depict the employer as a passive contributor
to the outcome-in Pinker's terminology, as a mere "enabler." Describing the
employer's input with words of mere enablement allowed the Court's causal
sites to shift to other inputs: in this case, to the women who were pregnant. The
Court compared the plaintiffs to all other workers and concluded that
39. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
40. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678, 679 n.17
(1983) (stating that "[w]hen Congress amended Title V1l in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its
disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision," and citing
portions of the PDA's legislative history documenting that the PDA was a reaction to and repudiation of
Gilbert).
41. 429 U.S. at 145-46.
42. Id. at 136.
43. See id. at 138.
44. See id. at 134, 138-39.
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pregnancy-related disabilities were "an additional risk" that these women
uniquely brought to the workplace. 45 By further describing that additional risk
as a voluntary one, through an implicit comparison to women who were not
pregnant, the Court stamped its causal attribution upon the plaintiffs rather than
the employer, thereby defeating the discrimination claim.
In contrast, Justice Brennan's dissent in Gilbert (in which Justice Marshall
concurred) invoked a different comparator set, which allowed the dissent to
recognize the employer's role as causal, rather than merely enabling. The
dissent implicitly compared the employer's disability policy to the counter-
factual of a policy that covered all non-occupational illnesses and injuries.4 6
Accordingly, the dissent described the employer's allegedly improper conduct
as actively excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from its otherwise
comprehensive program, rather than just passively failing to include them.47
The employer thus became analogous to the actor who rolled the marble at the
falling coin and knocked it in a different direction, rather than the actor who
merely prevented a rolling marble from doing the same.
One of the most important results of the PDA was to reject the comparison
set used by the Gilbert majority. In enacting the PDA, Congress recognized the
economic and social reality of pregnancy as a normal condition of employment,
and of pregnant women as a given in the workplace.4 8 This normalization of
pregnancy in the workplace was one of the pervasive themes in the PDA's
legislative history. Congressional testimony repeatedly emphasized three
crucial facts: the very large and rapidly growing size of the female workforce;
the very large proportion of women who become pregnant while engaged in the
paid workforce; and the financial necessity driving most women's labor force
participation. 49 Simply put, Congress recognized pregnancy as a status, rather
45. Id. at 138-39.
46. See id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 151-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. See Hannah Arterian Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The
Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 63, 84 (1980) ("The fact that pregnancy is a normal occurrence in the working life of female
employees was a basic premise of section 70 1(k)."); Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 939 (1985) (describing the PDA as a
congressional assertion "that pregnancy is and must be treated as a normal condition of employment").
49. See, e.g., Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on S. 995 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 2 (1977) (noting that "[n]early half our Nation's
children have mothers who are in the labor force"); Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the
Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong. 62 (1977) (statement of Dorothy
Czarnecki, M.D.) (urging that the "proper perspective" is to view pregnancy as "normal," and noting
that "[o]ver 40 percent of our work force is women" and that "[w]omen work because there is a need to
provide for themselves and their families"); 124 CONG. REc. 21, 442 (1978) (statement of Rep. Burke)
(noting that most women work out of economic necessity, with "more than 18 million working women
whose husbands earn less than $10,000 per year," and "[o]f that number, 6 million have husbands
earning less than $5,000 per year"); 124 CONG. REc. 21, 441 (1978) (statement of Rep. Garcia) (noting
that "56 percent of all American women work," and most do so out of necessity); 124 CONG. REc. 21,
440 (1978) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (noting that "[i]n recent years, the greatest increase in labor
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than a choice, and it used the PDA to reflect the reality that pregnant women
were in the workplace to stay.
In so doing, the PDA made it more difficult for judges to consider the
employee not being pregnant or not having pregnancy-related limitations on her
ability to work as a counter-factual when trying to identify the cause of the
pregnant employee losing her job, and it also made it more difficult for judges
to consider the volitional nature of pregnancy as a basis for resting
responsibility on the woman herself. In Pinker's matchstick example, he
observed that the mere fact that "oxygen is pretty much always around" helped
remove the presence of oxygen from our causal crosshairs. 50 Similarly, once
the PDA effectively required judges to recognize pregnant workers as "pretty
much always around," it made it more difficult for judges interpreting sex
discrimination law to treat a pregnant woman's decision to become a mother as
the cause of her workplace exclusion.
In Professor Wendy Williams' testimony to the House of Representatives,
she explained how normalizing pregnancy would help shift judges' causal
attributions for pregnant women's workplace struggles away from women
themselves and onto the workplaces that are designed to make pregnancy
incompatible with work. 51 "The starting point for analysis," explained
Professor Williams, "is the fact that around 80 percent of all women become
pregnant at some point in their worklives." 52 Professor Williams used that
background fact to help reveal the causal attribution error in judicial reasoning
force participation by women has been within the 20 to 34 age group, the most fertile childbearing
years"); 124 CONG. REC. 21, 437 (1978) (statement of Rep. Green) (noting that "[w]omen ranging from
25 to 34 years of age now represent 61.4 percent in the labor force population," and that "the majority of
women in this age bracket are mothers with dependent children in the home"); 124 CONG. REc. 21, 436
(1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin) (noting that "the most dramatic change in the American workforce in
the past decade is the growth of employment of women"; that "[f]ifty percent of all women aged 16 and
above are employed"; that women "constitute 42 percent of the current American workforce of 100.3
million workers"; that "the working wife and mother has become a commonplace in our society"; and
that most women are "not working as a matter of convenience ... but as a matter of necessity"); 123
CONG. REC. 29, 641 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting that "[t]he number of working mothers has
more than tripled since 1950"; that "[a]bout 85 percent of all working women will be pregnant at some
time during their working lives"; and that "[m]any of these working mothers are the heads of families");
123 CONG. REC. 29, 388 (1977) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that "women work because they
have to"; that "[s]eventy percent of the women who work, over 25 million, are women who need the
money to support their families, as they are either the sole wage earner, are married to husbands who
earn less than $7,000 a year, or are single, divorced, or widowed"; and that "[a]pproximately 80 percent
of working women become pregnant at some point during their working lives"); 123 CONG. REC. 29,
385 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams) (noting that "80 percent of women become pregnant in their
working lives," that "approximately 40 percent of all pregnant women are employed during their
pregnancy," and that "almost 40 percent of mothers with children under 6 years of age are employed");
123 CONG. REC. 10, 582 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (noting that "a large proportion of women
are likely to become pregnant in their working careers").
50. See PINKER, supra note 9, at 214.
51. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055
and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 95th Cong. 11-12 (1977) (statement of Wendy Williams, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law
School).
52. Id. at 12.
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in cases like the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board.53 In Cohen, the court had dismissed a school teacher's argument
that it was unconstitutional to force her to leave her teaching job because she
was pregnant. 54 The court had reasoned that "[n]o man-made law or regulation
excludes males from [the experiences of pregnancy and motherhood] and no
such laws can relieve females from all the burdens which naturally accompany
the joys and blessings of motherhood., 55 Professor Williams explained to
Congress that, in reality, "it is precisely man-made laws and rules which create
burdens for the working woman." 56 "It was not the mandate of Mrs. Cohen's
body, in its pregnant state, which caused Mrs. Cohen to be unable to continue
working," explained Professor Williams, "[r]ather, it was the employer rule
which forced Mrs. Cohen, a healthy, able-bodied worker, to leave work simply
because of the fact of her pregnancy."
57
Formally, the PDA accomplished this normalization of pregnancy and
corresponding effect on judicial causal attributions by adding a provision in
Title VII's definition section stating that the term "sex" includes "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions." 58 Although many courts had taken
that position and made appropriate causal attributions to employers in certain
types of pregnancy discrimination cases prior to Gilbert,59 the Supreme Court's
Gilbert decision demonstrated how easy it was for judges to direct their causal
attributions away from employers in the absence of a normative understanding
that pregnant workers should be viewed as an indisputable fact, rather than as a
small group of unique, volitional actors. The PDA's enactment was Congress's
first opportunity to publicly provide such a normative statement about the role
of pregnancy in the workplace, which had been absent in the original legislative
history of Title VII.
53. See id. at 11-12 (citing Cohen v. Chesterfield County Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)).
54. Cohen, 474 F.2d at 397.
55. Id. (internal quotations omitted). In Cohen, the Fourth Circuit repeatedly used active verbs
denoting causation when describing women as "becom[ing]" pregnant but used passive verbs denoting
mere enablement when describing the employer's policy as "notic[ing]" the fact that pregnancy affects
women's lives. Id. The Court went on to describe the women's choice to become pregnant as the most
easily controlled variable in the equation, stating that most women "wish" or "plan" to become pregnant
and often "seek to select the time for doing so." Id. at 398.
56. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055
and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 95th Cong. 12 (1977) (statement of Wendy Williams, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law
School).
57. Id.; see also 123 CONG. REc. 29, 662-63 (1977) (statement of Sen. Biden) (challenging the
relevance of pregnancy being "a voluntarily entered into condition" by emphasizing the fact that most
women work out of economic necessity and shifting the causal focus onto employers' "discriminatory
practices which pose barriers to working women in their struggle to secure equality in the workplace").
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
59. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975); Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); Commc'n Workers v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
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In addition to normalizing pregnant women in the workplace and thereby
reducing the salience of their own decisionmaking as a potential causal target
for judges, the PDA simultaneously increased the salience of employers' input
into the causal equation by necessitating judicial scrutiny of employers'
motivations for adverse employment decisions and by demanding judicial
inquiry into how employers treat other similarly-situated workers. The PDA
provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.,
60
Although this requirement that employers need only treat pregnant workers
"the same" as similarly-situated others has been criticized appropriately as
limiting the statute's transformative effect, 6 1 it at least served the purpose of
shifting judicial focus away from a pregnant woman's decision to become a
mother and onto an employer's treatment of pregnant women as members of
the larger workforce. As a result, visions of both an alternative employer
response and a more flexible workplace design became more plausible counter-
factuals and more easily-imagined alternative states of affairs, which at least set
the foundation for helping judges to identify the employer's causal role in
adverse employment actions against pregnant women.
The PDA's explicit rejection of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Gilbert majority makes it easy to characterize the PDA itself as having played a
causal role in cabining and directing judges' causal attributions in sex
discrimination claims. While women's dramatic increase in labor force
participation and related cultural forces, including the rise of second wave
feminism, eventually may have pushed the Supreme Court to reverse course
and join the set of circuit courts that previously had recognized pregnancy as a
protected status, the PDA certainly expedited that process in dramatic fashion
by curtailing Gilbert's reach.
While the primary focus of this Article is on the PDA's effect on judges'
causal attributions in pregnancy discrimination claims, one can speculate about
the PDA's effect on causal analysis more generally. While it is more difficult to
assess whether the PDA has affected the causal attributions of employers,
employees, or others, there is reason to suspect that the PDA has made at least
some contribution toward a more general recognition of pregnancy as status
rather than choice.
62
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
61. See, e.g., Nina G. Golden, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave: Taking Baby Steps Towards
Effective Policies, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 4-9 (2006); Siegel, supra note 48, at 931-33; Daniela M. de la
Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress Must Give Birth To Accommodation Rights That Protect
Pregnant Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275, 284-86 (2008); Jennifer Gottschalk, Comment,
Accommodating Pregnancy on the Job, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 266-67 (1996).
62. Beyond the question of what role the PDA has played in shifting the causal attributions of
employers, employees, or others is the more fundamental question of the extent to which such a shift has
occurred. To what extent have members of the public continued to believe that women should be viewed
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This suspicion is based in part on lessons from sociologists in the "new
institutionalism" tradition who have recognized that a law's practical meaning
is determined in part by studying its effects on organizational policies and
practices. 63 In the context of antidiscrimination law, the new institutionalists
have discovered that once employers identify a type of conduct as unlawful
discrimination, employers often implement defensive practices that go well
beyond what the law requires. 64 For example, many employers adopted "no
dating policies" in their workplaces in reaction to reports of sexual harassment
litigation, even though no case suggests that employers may be liable simply by
permitting consensual coworker dating. 65 As Professor Joan Williams has
recognized, "anti-discrimination law operates as a language of social ethics.
When people begin to see something as 'discrimination' in the U.S., they begin
to act quite differently, without tight reference to the specific contours of case
law." 66  This effect on organizational behavior is often the result of
intermediaries, such as human resource professionals, in-house counsel, and
employment lawyers, who translate legal obligations into institutional policies
and who often advise employers to go beyond the four comers of the law as a
litigation-avoidance strategy. 67 To the extent that this may be occurring in the
68
context of the PDA, the mere fact of organizational change might end up
changing the belief systems of those involved. Evidence suggests that beliefs
often follow behavior, rather than vice versa, as people attempt to resolve any
cognitive dissonance between the two by bringing their beliefs in line with their
as responsible if their decision to become pregnant makes them less able to compete in the labor market,
rather than recognize employers' role in designing exclusionary workplace practices, policies, and
norms? Unfortunately, this shift has been far from complete. Evidence suggests that motherhood
remains a pervasive trigger of negative gender stereotypes of assumed incompetence and lack of
commitment. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD": Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1326-30 (2008) (summarizing the social science literature and concluding that
"bias against mothers is the strongest and most open form of gender bias in the workplace today").
63. See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans With
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=l137023, at 4; Joan C. Williams &
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against
on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 120 (2003).
64. See Travis, supra note 63, at 3; Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall
as a Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 11 (2003); Williams & Segal, supra note
63, at 120-21.
65. See Williams, supra note 64, at 11.
66. Id.
67. See Travis, supra note 63, at 4, 47.
68. Advice newsletters from employer-side employment law firms to their clients suggest that this
is at least a possibility. See, e.g., Crowell & Moring, Avoiding a Maternal Profiling Claim,
http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Newsletter.aspx?id=859 (last visited Apr. 4, 2009) (urging
employers not only to follow the legal requirements of pregnancy discrimination law, but also to avoid
"otherwise engaging in activity that may be perceived as stereotyping" or treating pregnant workers or
mothers differently); Gordon & Rees, LLP, Publications: Employment Law Alert, Pregnancy
Discrimination Claims, http://www.gordonrees.com/pubs/employmentLawAlert_100107w.cfm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2009) (urging employers to take "extra care" whenever they are "dealing with women
who are expecting the birth of a child, or who are on or recently returned from maternity leave").
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conduct. 69 In other words, if the law changes behavior, changes in attitude may
not be far behind.
While it is thus possible that the PDA may have affected causal reasoning
outside the confines of judicial chambers, the remainder of this Article will
continue to focus on the PDA's effect on judges' causal attributions in
pregnancy discrimination claims. While case law helps reveal how the PDA has
directed judges' causal attributions in the right direction from the perspective of
an "unreasonable woman," its ability to fully adapt the workplace to the
realities of pregnancy has limits. The following sections will describe the
varying levels of success that the unreasonable woman's agenda has achieved
in the courts with varying types of PDA claims.
A. Disparate Treatment Claims: Partial Success
In disparate treatment claims, pregnant women allege that their employers
intentionally took an adverse action against them because of their pregnancy.
These claims can be categorized into three general types: (1) claims in which
the pregnant employee can perform all job functions under the conditions
established by the employer, but the employer nevertheless treats the employee
adversely with respect to the terms, conditions, or benefits of the job; (2) claims
in which the pregnant employee needs some alteration of the job conditions
established by the employer and the employer refuses, although the employer
grants requests by non-pregnant workers who require similar alterations for
other reasons; and (3) claims in which the pregnant employee needs some
alteration of the job conditions established by the employer and the employer
refuses, just as the employer does for non-pregnant workers who require similar
alterations for other reasons. In the first two categories, but not the third, the
PDA has been successful at facilitating employer-focused causal attributions by
judges and thereby holding the employer responsible under antidiscrimination
law.
The first category of cases includes, among others, situations like the
Gilbert case itself, where the scope of an employer's benefits package is at
issue rather than a pregnant employee's inability to perform within the
conventional workplace design. 70 In Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., for
69. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 7, at 3, 17; see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 30 (1993) (explaining that "changes in behavior" can lead to
"changes in attitude" because "the pressure to feel consistent will often lead people to bring their beliefs
in line with their behavior").
70. Another type of case in this category is one in which an employer takes an adverse job action
against a pregnant employee based on the assumption that the employee will need accommodations. See,
e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that although the bank
could lawfully fire an employee for absenteeism even if that absenteeism is caused by pregnancy, the
PDA prohibits the bank from firing an employee because it assumes that her pregnancy will make her
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example, a class of female employees brought a PDA claim against their
employer for excluding prescription contraceptives from its health care benefits
plan.7 1 Under Gilbert, the court likely would have characterized the employer
as having provided equal coverage to men and women, as having merely failed
to include an additional and volitional pregnancy-related risk, and therefore not
as an active discriminator. Post-PDA, the district court in Cooley was required
to view the case in the same way that the dissent had viewed the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities from the employer's disability benefits plan in
Gilbert. With the PDA having normatively positioned pregnant workers as an
undisputed fact of employment, the Cooley court viewed pregnancy as a
"'status"' rather than as a choice. 72 In a small victory for all of us unreasonable
women, the court stated that the PDA "recognizes that women have different
sex-specific needs for which provisions must be made to the same extent as
other health care requirements." 73 The court therefore turned its attention to the
employer and identified the employer's active role in "selectively excluding
prescription contraceptives from its otherwise comprehensive benefit plan."
74
Using the treatment of men as a counter-factual-a group that was "protected
from all categories of risk"-it became easy to identify the employer's causal
and discriminatory role in granting women "only partial protection. 75
The PDA has had similar success in facilitating judges making causal
attributions to employers in cases involving pregnant employees who need
workplace changes or rule modifications, at least where employers have
provided such flexibility to similarly-situated others. These cases are significant
because the pregnancy-related limitations on the employees' ability to perform
the job in its conventional design can provide a highly salient causal focus
when judges are reviewing adverse job consequences. The PDA's requirement
that courts compare the employer's treatment of the pregnant worker to the
employer's treatment of other workers with similar limitations on their ability
to work is thus quite useful in ensuring that judges identify the employer's
causal role in what might otherwise be deemed a performance-based
termination. The PDA's comparator requirement forces judges to consider
behavioral counter-factuals on the employer's side, and it allows judges to
perceive the employer's control in situations in which the employer merely
fails to accommodate. The decisions in Adams v. Nolan,76 EEOC v. Ackerman,
Hood & McQueen, Inc.,77 and Scherr v. Woodland School Community
unavailable during the bank's critical summer months without any evidence that such absences will
occur).
71. 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
72. Id. at 984 (quoting UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991)).
73. Id. at 985.
74. Id. at 984 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. 962 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1992).
77. 956 F.2d 944 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992).
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Consolidated Dist. No. 5078 are three examples of this second category of cases
in which employers' own conduct has demonstrated the feasibility of
workplace flexibility, thereby facilitating employer-directed causal attributions
by the courts.
In Adams, the employer denied a patrol officer's request to transfer to a
light duty position during her pregnancy, which forced her to take an unpaid
leave. 79 The Eighth Circuit reversed a bench trial and held that the employee
had stated a cognizable discrimination claim. 80 The court could have
considered the counter-factual of the plaintiff not becoming pregnant, could
have noted that the pregnancy rendered the plaintiff temporarily unable to
perform her required job duties, and could have held that her own pregnancy-
based performance limitations were the cause of the negative employment
action. But since the PDA declared pregnancy a "given" rather than a choice,
and because the PDA requires an inquiry into how the employer treats
similarly-situated others, the court instead considered the fact that the employer
had granted light duty transfers to other workers with temporary work
restrictions from non-pregnancy-related conditions. 81 This easily-identifiable
counter-factual on the employer's side of the equation made evident the
employer's causal role in the employee's forced leave. Because of this
comparison, the necessary circumstance that appeared most easy to control-
and therefore most causally influential-was the employer's decision to
exclude pregnant women from its transfer policy, rather than the employee's
inability to perform the job as traditionally designed. Because responsibility
follows causal attribution, the court labeled the employer's conduct
discriminatory.
In Ackerman, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a bench trial for the plaintiff, who
was fired for requesting that she not be required to work over forty hours per
week during her pregnancy. 82 The court rejected the employer's argument that
the employee herself caused the termination by her insubordinate refusal to
work overtime. 83 Once again, by establishing pregnancy as a normal state of
employment and by demanding an inquiry into the employer's treatment of
similarly-situated others, the PDA directed the court's attention to the
employer. The court focused on the fact that the employer had granted other
employees' requests for leaves or work schedule adjustments for a variety of
non-pregnancy-related personal needs, 84 which provided a ready counter-
factual to the employer's response to the plaintiff's request. This allowed the
78. 867 F.2d 974, 978-80 (7th Cir. 1988).
79. 962 F.2d at 792-93.
80. Id. at 792.
81. Id. at 795-96.
82. 956 F.2d at 945.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 948.
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court to see the employer as an active participant in excluding the employee
from a flexible work option instead of a passive participant in merely failing to
provide workplace accommodations. Accordingly, rather than attribute the
employee's fate to her own pregnancy-based limitations on her ability to work,
the court attributed her termination to the employer's lack of "effort" to
respond to her restrictions, "despite a history of doing just that for employees
with other medical concerns."
8 5
In Scherr, the Seventh Circuit found a triable discrimination claim against
an employer who refused to allow pregnant teachers who took unpaid maternity
leaves to extend their time off with accumulated paid sick leave, while allowing
non-pregnant workers to combine accumulated paid sick leave with extended
unpaid personal leave for other types of temporary disabilities.8 6 The court
recognized that this result was due to a combination of both the employee
becoming pregnant and the specific design of the employer's disability leave
plan.8 7 In selecting the cause among these two necessary circumstances, the
dissent and the majority focused on different counter-factuals. The dissent
considered the counter-factual of a pregnant teacher deciding to take paid sick
leave instead of unpaid maternity leave.88 This led the dissent to deem the
pregnant teacher the one in control of the outcome and therefore the causally
responsible actor.8 9 "The school districts' leave policies do not 'force' the
teachers to give up sick days," reasoned the dissent, "instead, the teachers
presumably choose to forego paid sick days because they want to spend more
time at home after their pregnancy rather than immediately return to work when
their pregnancy-related disabilities end." 90 The majority, in contrast, correctly
followed the PDA's mandate to consider the employer's treatment of similarly-
situated employees. 91 The fact that the employer allowed other employees to
combine paid and unpaid leave made the counter-factual of an even-handed
disability policy a reasonable alternative state of affairs, thereby allowing the
majority to rest causal responsibility on the employer. The majority took
seriously the PDA's mandate to treat pregnant workers as a given and therefore
carefully scrutinized the mismatch between "the needs of pregnant teachers"
and "the actual coverage" of the employer's policy. 
92
While these cases are encouraging, the PDA's comparator requirement has
had a limited effect on shifting causal attributions to employers in the
remaining category of disparate treatment cases in which comparators are
unavailable. These cases also involve pregnant employees who need some
85. Id. at 949.
86. Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 975-83 (7th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 982.
88. Id. at 986 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 975-82.
92. Id. at 983.
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alteration of conventional job requirements and employers who refuse to
accommodate, but the employers' inflexibility is uniformly applied to all
workers who are similarly limited in their ability to work. Because the courts in
these cases have no easy counter-factual against which to compare the
employer's response to the accommodation request, they instead compare the
pregnant employee's performance to someone without physical restrictions,
which results in a causal attribution to the employee's performance limitations,
rather than to the employer's rigid and exclusionary workplace design.
In Gratton v. JetBlue Airways,93 for example, the plaintiff alleged that her
employer forced her to take extended leave after refusing to provide light duty
options to accommodate her pregnancy-related restrictions on lifting and
working outdoors in the heat. Because the employee did "not identifly] any
accommodation given to other temporarily disabled employees that was
withheld from her," the court viewed the employee's own inability to perform
the required job duties as the cause of her termination and granted the employer
summary judgment.94 Similarly, in EEOC v. Detroit-Macomb Hospital
Corp.,95 a nurse and a nurse's aide were forced to take involuntary medical
leaves when their pregnancies prevented them from performing tasks in certain
portions of the hospital that would pose risks to their unborn fetuses. Because
there was no proof that the hospital "treated pregnant employees worse than
employees with medical restrictions who were not pregnant," the court viewed
the employees' own inability to perform required job duties as the cause of
their leaves and affirmed summary judgment for the employer.96 In both cases,
there was no available counter-factual of the employer's treatment of similarly-
situated others to make salient the employer's causal role in designing an
exclusionary workplace, so the highly salient counter-factual of the employees'
own pre-pregnancy performance facilitated a causal attribution to the
employees' post-pregnancy performance limitations.
In these cases, the courts implicitly are creating a false dichotomy between
behavioral and situational characterizations of the employer: the "employer-as-
decisionmaker" versus the "employer-as-workplace." While demonstrating a
willingness to see the employer as causal when there is evidence that the
employer made one decision for a pregnant employee and a different decision
for a similarly-situated non-pregnant employee, courts have not readily
identified the employer's similar causal role in designing job requirements or
policies around the norm of a worker who does not face periodic physical
limitations that may demand light duty work, limited hours, or time off. In the
latter scenario, the employer is not seen as an actor at all, but rather as
93. No. 04-7561, 2006 WL 2037912, at *1-*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2006).
94. Id. at *7.
95. Nos. 91-1088, 91-1278, 1992 WL 6099, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 1992).
96. Id. at *2.
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situational background, thereby rendering the employer unavailable as a causal
target.
This distinction reflects what social scientists have long documented as the
most pervasive causal attribution bias: the "fundamental attribution error." 97 In
addition to the conceptual semantics that Pinker has identified as affecting the
accuracy of our causal attribution process, the fundamental attribution error can
result in causal reasoning that is at odds with the realities of "but for"
causation. When trying to assess the cause of a social event, our potential
causal attribution targets can be divided into two general categories: first are
"internal" or "personal" targets, which are attributes of an actor involved in the
event, such as the actor's level of effort, ability, or intelligence; and second are
"external" or "situational" targets, which are attributes of the environment in
which the social event took place, such as the weather, the task difficulty, or
even luck.98 Social scientists have found that observers tend to over-attribute to
internal causes and under-attribute to external causes. 99 In other words, the
fundamental attribution error describes our tendency to perceive people as
causing social events, while we underestimate the power of situational
constraints in controlling peoples' behavior. 100
The PDA's requirement that pregnant women "be treated the same" as
similarly-situated others helps shift judges' causal attributions from one person
(the pregnant woman) to another person (the "employer-as-decisionmaker") by
making salient a behavioral counter-factual for the latter. When an employer
refuses to accommodate a pregnant worker but grants an accommodation to
someone else with similar limitations, judges following the PDA will identify
the employer as a cause of the pregnant worker's performance struggles, rather
than as a mere enabler, in Pinker's terms. The shortcoming of the PDA's
"same" treatment requirement is that it does not require judges to generate
situational counter-factuals, which means that the PDA does nothing to
overcome the fundamental attribution error that makes situational constraints
fade into judges' cognitive background. Without requiring consideration of
possible alternative workplace policies, practices, organizational norms, or
workplace designs, the PDA does not directly help judges identify the
employer's causal role when a pregnant woman struggles to perform in the face
97. See Ross, supra note 10, at 184-85 (coining this term and noting that this attribution bias "has
been noted by many theorists" and "disputed by few"); see also Travis, supra note 12, at 519-25
(describing the social science evidence documenting and explaining the fundamental attribution error).
98. See HEWSTONE, supra note 10, at 30-31 (explaining the historical development of the
internal/external causal attribution dimension); DAVID 0. SEARS ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 118-19
(6th ed. 1988) (identifying the internal/external dimension as the "central issue in most perceptions of
causality"); Travis, supra note 12, at 514 (describing the internal/external causal attribution dimension).
99. See Ross, supra note 10, at 183-85, 193-94.
100. See HEWSTONE, supra note 10, at 50; RICHARD NISBETr & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 31 (1980); SEARS ET AL., supra note 98, at
136-37; Ross, supra note 10, at 183-85, 193-94; see also Travis, supra note 12, at 519-22 (summarizing
the social science evidence documenting this phenomenon).
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of a uniformly-applied workplace practice that is inhospitable to her physical
limitations. In those situations, there is nothing to help overcome the natural
tendency that judges share with all of us to make an internal causal attribution
(in this case, to see the pregnant woman as the cause of her own performance
struggles), as there is nothing to increase the salience of the situational
constraints (in this case, to reveal the role that rigid workplace practices play in
the woman's perceived performance shortfall). 101
However, while the PDA's express language does not directly facilitate
situational attributions that could help judges overcome the fundamental
attribution error, the PDA is actually a definition housed within Title VII's full
set of substantive provisions. One of those provisions is the prohibition against
facially neutral practices that have a disproportionate effect on members of a
protected group. As described below, considering the PDA in the context of
such disparate impact claims could help courts identify the causal role of the
"employer-as-workplace" in cases in which no comparator is available.
B. Disparate Impact Claims: Untapped Potential
Disparate impact claims hold the greatest potential for plaintiffs to use the
PDA to advance the unreasonable woman's agenda of adapting the workplace
to the realities of pregnancy. The Supreme Court first endorsed the disparate
impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 10 2 in 1971, seven years before the
PDA's enactment in 1978. Congress later amended Title VII through the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to explicitly codify the disparate impact theory that the
Griggs Court had recognized as implicit in Title VII's more general
provisions. 0 3 Under the 1991 Act, employers are prohibited from "us[ing] a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of..
. sex," if the employer fails to demonstrate that the practice is "job related" and
"consistent with business necessity."'14 Even if the employer makes such a
showing, the employer will still be liable if the employee can show that it
refused to adopt an "alternative employment practice" that serves its business
necessity with a less discriminatory effect.105 Because the PDA defined "sex"
to include "pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions," the disparate
101. Cf Travis, Recapturing, supra note 7, at 13-16 (explaining how the fundamental attribution
error helps to essentialize the conventional workplace design and render invisible the structural and
organizational aspects of the workplace that often make it impossible for workers with caregiving
responsibilities to succeed).
102. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
103. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)) (stating that the purpose of the amendment was to codify Griggs).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
105. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
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impact theory is available to attack employment practices that
disproportionately affect pregnant women.1
0 6
The transformative potential of disparate impact claims comes from the
fact that they challenge a workplace practice, rather than an individual
employment decision, which means that the remedy may include eliminating or
modifying the practice across the board, rather than just exempting an
individual employee from a workplace requirement.'0 7 This model gives
pregnant women a way to address the "employer-as-workplace" scenarios
described above, in which women face default structures that are inhospitable
to the demands of pregnancy, such as no-leave or inadequate leave policies,
inflexible hour requirements, mandatory overtime rules, or the refusal to
provide light duty work. 108 By demanding judicial consideration of situational
counter-factuals against which to compare the employer's conduct, the
"alternative employment practices" provision could facilitate judicial
recognition of an employer's causal role. Most importantly, the consideration
of situational counter-factuals could help judges overcome the fundamental
attribution error that otherwise would make a pregnant employee's own
performance limitations the most salient causal target. Moreover, by revealing
an employer's control over various aspects of the conventional workplace
design that would otherwise be viewed as inaction, the disparate impact theory
should render irrelevant the lack of a comparator whom the employer treated
differently from the plaintiff when assessing a pregnancy discrimination claim.
106. See generally Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25
STETSON L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1995) (explaining how the PDA's text and legislative history support the
availability of disparate impact claims under the PDA); Siegel, supra note 48, at 929 (arguing that the
disparate impact theory should be available in pregnancy discrimination claims).
107. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 7, at 38 (comparing the remedies in disparate impact and
accommodation claims); Travis, Virtual Workplace, supra note 7, at 329-30 (same).
108. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (2008) (stating that "an employment policy under which
insufficient or no leave is available" may violate the law by disproportionately excluding women, if such
policy is "not justified by business necessity"); Calloway, supra note 106, at 42 (arguing that
"[d]isparate impact analysis can be used to resolve many of the accommodation problems faced by
pregnant women," by allowing them to bring a claim if, for example, "an employer does not permit
employees with medical needs to take leave, request light duty, take bathroom breaks, or work a flexible
schedule"); Maureen E. Lally-Green, The Implications of Inadequate Maternity Leave Policies Under
Title VII, 16 VT. L. REv. 223, 255-60 (1991) (arguing that policies providing inadequate pregnancy
leave or requiring a choice between sick leave and maternity leave are subject to disparate impact
challenge); see also Travis, Recapturing, supra note 7, at 77-91 (explaining how the disparate impact
theory could be used to transform workplace structures that are not designed around a caregiving worker
norm); Williams & Segal, supra note 63, at 134-38 (explaining how to litigate disparate impact cases to
effectively gain workplace accommodations for family caregivers).
The disparate impact theory also has been used to challenge benefits packages that exclude
pregnancy-related health items from coverage. See, e.g., Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp.
2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that a class of female employees established a prima facie disparate
impact case under Title VII, as amended by the PDA, against an employer's health care plan that
excluded coverage for prescription contraceptives). While this type of disparate impact claim does not
restructure the workplace to accommodate pregnant women, it is still quite significant in helping
pregnant women obtain parity in compensation and basic medical care.
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In one of the most promising early cases, Abraham v. Graphic Arts
International Union, 109 the D.C. Circuit found a triable disparate impact claim
against a union's inadequate leave policy for pregnancy. The employer's
contract with the union limited all temporary employees to ten days of sick
leave and ten days of vacation, with no other type of leave.' 10 Under this
policy, the employer fired the plaintiff when she requested pregnancy leave. 111
"An employer can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of an adequate
leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it does have," held the court,
"and it takes little imagination to see that an omission may in particular
circumstances be as invidious as positive action." 
112
Several lower courts have reached similar favorable conclusions. In EEOC
v. Warshawsky & Co., 113 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted the plaintiff summary judgment on a claim alleging that an employer's
failure to provide sick leave during the first year of employment was a practice
that disparately impacted women due to pregnancy. "[I]f an employer denies
adequate disability leave across the board," held the court, "women will be
disproportionately affected."' 14 In Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor
& Industry,1 15 a Montana state court similarly recognized a disparate impact
claim against an employer's ban on leaves of absence for temporary disabilities
during an employee's first year of work. Because "the employer provided a
leave policy that was inadequate for pregnant women," the court found the
employer liable under the PDA. 1
16
109. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 819.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 819 & n.66 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (2008)).
113. 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. II1. 1991).
114. Id. at 654.
115. 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984), vacated, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987) (requesting reconsideration in
light of Cal. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)), reinstated, 744 P.2d 871, 874
(Mont. 1987) (reaching the same decision even in light of Cal. Fed.).
116. 692 P.2d at 1252; see also Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 299, 306-08 (3d Cir.
1997) (McKee, I., dissenting) (criticizing the court's holding that Title V11 does not require an employer
to grant maternity leave or to reinstate an employee after maternity leave and suggesting that the
disparate impact theory may apply because "[p]regnancy and absence are not ... analytically distinct");
Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal
of plaintiff's disparate impact challenge to her employer's leave policy, but noting in dicta that "[t]his is
not to say that a policy which does not provide adequate leave to accommodate the period of disability
associated with pregnancy might not be vulnerable under a disparate impact theory of liability under
Title VII," and acknowledging that "courts have struck down such policies"); Scherr v. Woodland Sch.
Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 978-80 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding a triable disparate impact
claim against an employer who refused to allow pregnant teachers who took unpaid maternity leaves to
extend their time off with accumulated paid sick leave, while the employer allowed non-pregnant
workers to combine accumulated paid sick leave with extended unpaid personal leave for other types of
temporary disabilities); Marafino v. St. Louis County Cir. Ct., 537 F. Supp. 206, 213 (E.D. Mo. 1982)
(suggesting that an employer's "policy of refusing to hire those who planned to take an early leave of
absence" was a practice subject to disparate impact analysis, but holding that the plaintiff failed to show
the practice disproportionately affected women), afrd, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
The PDA's Causation Effect
While these cases are very promising, the full potential for using disparate
impact claims in conjunction with the PDA to redesign workplaces around the
needs of pregnant women currently remains unrealized. 117 More recent courts
have fallen prey to the fundamental attribution error and refused to see the
causal role that employers play in designing inadequate leave or flexibility
policies, which these courts describe as the absence of a "practice" that would
be subject to disparate impact review. 18 In Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-
Illinois,'19 for example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
the employer in a claim alleging that the employer's rigid attendance policies
disparately impacted pregnant women who may be unable to work traditional
hours because of morning sickness or other complications. Rather than
characterizing the bank's absenteeism policies as "practices" subject to
disparate impact analysis, the court characterized them as "legitimate
requirements" of the job, or simply as the "work for which she had been
hired." 120 The court described the employer as not having adopted any
challengeable rule or practice, and the court conversely described the pregnant
employee as having asked the employer "to excuse" her from performing her
job.121 By thus defining the employer's role in situational terms and the
employee's role in behavioral terms, the court inevitably attributed the
employee's perceived performance shortfalls to her own personal limitations,
rather than to the constraints imposed by the employer's choice of one
attendance policy over another.' 
22
117. See Dowd, supra note 7, at 141-42 (arguing that Title VII cannot restructure the workplace to
ameliorate work and family conflicts because of its "inability to reach cases in which an employer has
failed to adopt any policy"); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. Micti. J.L.
REFORM 371, 413-15 (2001) (arguing that Title VII's disparate impact theory has limited ability to
restructure the workplace to address work and family conflicts because courts have not characterized the
absence of an affirmative policy as employer conduct); Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out
Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 30-35 (2007) (describing the historic rise and
fall of disparate impact claims challenging employers' no-leave or inadequate leave policies for
pregnant women); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 7, at 36-46 (describing limitations on the use of
disparate impact claims to restructure workplaces around caregivers); Travis, Virtual Workplace, supra
note 7, at 355-56 (describing cases in which courts have held that default organizational structures
represent the absence of any policy subject to disparate impact challenge).
118. See, e.g., Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that Title
VII "does not require an employer to grant maternity leave or to reinstate an employee after maternity
leave"); Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VII does
not "require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women
to work," nor does it require employers "to make it as easy" for pregnant women "as it is for their
spouses to continue working").
119. 223 F.3d 579, 581-85 (7th Cir. 2000).
120. Id. at 583-84.
121. Id. at 585.
122. See id. In Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit
similarly affirmed summary judgment for the employer in a claim alleging that the employer's policy of
firing employees with more than three absences during a ninety-day probationary period disparately
impacted pregnant women. Under this policy, the employer had fired the employee after being absent
for more than three days because of a miscarriage. Id. at 858-59. The court characterized the employer's
strict attendance policy as merely situational background, rather than as a "practice" subject to disparate
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These divergent sets of cases reveal the relatively weaker constraint that
the PDA places on judicial causal attributions in disparate impact claims than in
disparate treatment claims. In disparate treatment claims, described above, the
PDA's "same as" language explicitly requires judges to generate employer-side
behavioral counter-factuals by assessing how an employer treated similarly-
situated non-pregnant employees in order to determine if the plaintiff has stated
a prima facie intentional discrimination claim. In a disparate impact case, the
portion of the legal doctrine that most directly requires judges to generate
employer-side situational counter-factuals is the assessment of less
discriminatory alternative employment practices. That inquiry typically is
reached only after a plaintiff successfully proves a prima facie case of disparate
impact and the employer successfully defends the existing practice on the basis
of business necessity. At best, the legal doctrine might implicitly direct judges
to generate counter-factuals at the business necessity defense stage, as the
existence of feasible alternatives may be relevant in assessing an employer's
justification of the existing practice. As a result, judges are relatively less
constrained in their causal attributions when assessing the plaintiff's prima
facie case, which means that causal attribution biases or errors by judges at that
initial stage can effectively end the plaintiff's case. While there may be many
explanations for the outcomes in successful versus unsuccessful disparate
impact cases, including both factual differences and differences in judges'
ideologies, those differences appear at least to have reflected themselves in
divergent causal attributions when assessing the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
One significant factual difference present in the successful cases of
Abraham, Warshawsky, and Miller-Wohl (but not in the unsuccessful case of
Dormeyer) is that the employers applied their challenged facially-neutral
practices to only a portion of their workforce. In Abraham, the challenged
practice of making no leave time available beyond ten days of sick leave and
ten days of vacation applied only to any "full-time temporary employee," while
the employer made generous leave time available to "each of its three classes of
regular full-time permanent employees."' 23 In Warshawsky, the challenged
practice of making no sick leave available applied to employees who had
worked less than a year, while the employer provided paid sick leave for
employees who had worked a year or more.' 24 In Miller-Wohl, the challenged
practice of making no leaves of absence available for temporary disabilities
similarly applied only to employees during their first year of work. 125 In
impact review. By describing the attendance policy as an "actual, legitimate requirement[] of the job,"
and as the lack of a medical leave or vacation practice, the court rendered the employer a virtual non-
actor in the event. See id. at 859-62.
123. 660 F.2d 811,818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
124. 768 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. II1. 1991).
125. 692 P.2d. 1243, 1249 (Mont. 1984).
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Dormeyer, in contrast, the challenged attendance practice appeared to apply to
the entire workforce.' 
26
Legally, this factual distinction should not be dispositive. In a prima facie
disparate impact case, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that a facially neutral
employment practice disproportionately affected members of a protected group,
not that the employer applied a different practice to some employees than to
others. However, this factual distinction appears to have played a role in the
judges' causal attributions, which in turn affected their findings on the
plaintiffs' prima facie case. In Abraham, Warshawsky, and Miller-Wohl, the
fact that the employer applied different facially-neutral policies to different
categories of workers provided the judges with a highly salient counter-factual
on the employer's side of the equation. This fact allowed the judges in each of
those cases to view the no-leave policies as an active choice by the employers,
turning a workplace attribute into an employer behavior. By shifting the
"employer-as-workplace" into the "employer-as-decisionmaker," this crucial
fact likely helped overcome the fundamental attribution error and allowed the
judges to view the no-leave policies as "practices" subject to disparate impact
challenge. In Dormeyer, in contrast, no salient situational counter-factual
existed to highlight the element of employer choice in establishing attendance
expectations. Instead, the judge viewed the no-absence policy not as an act by
the employer, but as a defining characteristic of the job itself, part of the
situational background that evaded causal recognition.
The judges in Abraham, Warshawsky, and Miller-Wohl also appeared to
take more seriously the PDA's objective of normalizing pregnancy in the
workplace, which, as described above, made it more difficult to consider the
volitional nature of pregnancy a basis for resting responsibility on the woman
herself. In Abraham, the court found it significant that the PDA's legislative
history documented the "normal period of pregnancy leave" as much greater
than that provided by the employer's facially neutral policy when finding the
employer causally responsible for the employee's inability to perform.127 In
Warshawsky, the court described the PDA as endorsing the "commonsense
view" of pregnancy as a status intertwined with sex and as "[making] clear that
pregnancy was a condition that affected women employees." 2 8 In Miller- Wohl,
the court followed the EEOC's lead in taking "official notice of the fact that
pregnancy, being a natural, expectable, and societally necessary condition, is
certain to occur in a statistically predictable number of females in the labor
force."' 129 In each of these cases, this respect for the PDA's normalization of
pregnancy helped enable the judges to view the employers' policies, rather than
126. 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000).
127. 660 F.2d at 819 & n.64.
128. 768 F. Supp. at 653.
129. 692 P.2dat 1254.
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the plaintiffs' pregnancies, as the primary cause of the plaintiffs' inabilities to
perform. The Dormeyer opinion, in contrast, contains no explicit recognition of
the normative backing that the PDA provided to pregnancy as a status, rather
than a choice, and it is therefore unsurprising that the opinion characterizes the
pregnant plaintiffs claim as a request to "excuse" her from performing her
job. 130 As these contrasting cases illustrate, it remains unclear to what extent
pregnant women may use the PDA not merely as a "shield against
discrimination," but also as a "sword" to attack the inflexible workplace
designs that are just as effective as outright prejudice in excluding pregnant
women from meaningful equality at work. 1
31
II. LIMITATIONS: UNREASONABLE WOMEN'S UNFINISHED WORK
Even if courts begin realizing the full transformative potential of the
disparate impact theory, the PDA's effect on causal analysis inevitably will be
incomplete. Because the PDA established pregnancy as a normal condition of
employment but did not incorporate the broader norm of women who
breastfeed or who have significant caregiving responsibilities, it failed to raise
the causal salience of an employer's role in designing a workplace that
disadvantages mothers over the long-term. In Piantanida v. Wyman Center Inc.,
for example, the Eighth Circuit rejected a woman's discrimination claim
alleging that she was demoted because of her employer's belief that her prior
position was incompatible with childrearing responsibilities. 132 The court
attributed the cause of-and therefore the responsibility for-the plaintiffs
demotion to her own decision to take on the "social role" of a parent and her
own "choice to care for a child."
' 133
The federal district court in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co. made explicit the
PDA's incomplete causal shift when it rejected an employee's discrimination
claim alleging that her employer had refused her request for a six-week leave of
absence after her maternity leave because her baby could not be weaned from
breastfeeding, and had fired her when she could not return to work. 134 The
court held that breastfeeding was not covered by the PDA's protection of
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," and therefore the pre-
PDA approach in Gilbert still applied. 135 As in Gilbert, the court characterized
130. 223 F.3d at 585.
131. This distinction comes from Rhet v. Carnegie Ctr. Assoc., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997),
in which the court held "the PDA is a shield.., not a sword in the hands of a pregnant employee."
132. 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997).
133. Id.; see also Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-92 (D. Colo. 1997)
(holding that an employer's refusal to provide a part-time schedule for breastfeeding or childrearing did
not violate Title VII because the PDA only protects "medical conditions related to pregnancy or
childbirth").
134. 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991).
135. See id. at 869.
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the employer's role as a passive enabler of the outcome by "merely remov[ing]
one situation, breast-feeding, from those for which personal leave will be
granted."' 136 As in Gilbert, the court therefore shifted its causal focus to the
employee by ignoring the medical necessity of her baby's breastfeeding
demands and characterizing the employee in volitional terms as "want[ing/ to
stay home to take care of the child,"' 137 and "wishing to nurse" her baby. 138 By
failing to normalize caregiving, Congress paved the way for courts like the one
in Wallace to avoid employer responsibility by holding that "child-care
concerns" are not covered by the "plain language" of the PDA. 1
39
More generally, the limits on the PDA's ability to shift causal attributions
toward employers under a variety of conditions highlights the limits of relying
on an antidiscrimination model in the first place to address the misfit between
the conventional workplace and working women's lives. 14  Because of
antidiscrimination law's reliance on simple causation models as a basis for
attributing legal responsibility, it will always be an incomplete method for
transforming the workplace around a caregiving worker norm. 141 That is not to
understate the significance of antidiscrimination law-and of the PDA in
particular-to the unreasonable woman's agenda, given the immediate
availability of this tool and the enduring resonance of equal opportunity
rhetoric. 142 But it does highlight the importance of viewing employment
discrimination law as just one tool in a multifaceted approach.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 869-70 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4749, 4753 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)).
138. See id. at 870 (quoting Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted)).
139. See id.
140. In addition to directly mandating workplace flexibility, such as paid maternity leaves, another
option would be to use an accommodation model. One potential negative consequence of the PDA's
normalization of pregnancy, however, is that it may have contributed to the exclusion of ordinary
pregnancy from the definition of disability in the Americans with Disabilities Act, which contains one of
the few legal mandates for the types of workplace accommodations that most pregnant workers might
seek, such as light duty work, job restructuring, flex-time, part-time, and temporary leaves. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(9)(B) (2000) (defining "reasonable accommodation" to include "job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,.... and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities"); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2008) (stating that because pregnancy is "not
the result of a physiological disorder," it is not an impairment and, therefore, not a disability); see Jessie
v. Carter Health Care Ctr., 926 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that because "[n]o unusual
circumstances exist[ed]" with respect to the employee's pregnancy, "such condition [was] not a
'physical impairment' under the ADA"); see also Colette G. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and
Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J.
193, 194, 198 (1993) (arguing that feminists should not "fear the characterization of pregnancy as a
disability," and that the ADA's text and remedial purpose supports interpreting disability to include
pregnancy).
141. Cf Schultz & Petterson, supra note 38 (analyzing cases in which courts attributed the cause of
women's segregation in low-paying, dead-end jobs to women's own lack of interest in better positions
rather than to any discriminatory action by the employers).
142. See Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 279, 316-17 (1998) (arguing that "equality rhetoric (and discrimination
claims, which are really claims of equality withheld), are the strongest weapons Americans [sic]
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CONCLUSION
While significant work remains to be done before we realize the ultimate
goal of workplaces that fully embrace workers with caregiving responsibilities,
that unfinished business should not diminish the importance of the PDA as an
initial and successful groundbreaking step. By providing the conceptual tools to
begin shifting judges' causal sites away from female workers' perceived
shortcomings and onto employers and the shortcomings of workplace design
itself, the PDA laid the foundation for future legal efforts to hold employers
responsible for the remaining social, structural, and organizational barriers to
achieving full workplace equality for women.
feminists have in a culture deeply committed to a self-image of equality"); see also Dowd, supra note 7,
at 154-55 (explaining that using antidiscrimination law in the work/family context "takes advantage of
an existing set of ideas and legal categories that retain great power and persuasive capacity").
[Vol. 21:51
